

Talking Points

NSC Meeting on Tuesday, 27 April 1982

NSSD 1-82

Security Assistance

- In general, the NSSD papers understate and do not describe fully the challenge to US interests in critical regions of the Third World posed by Soviet-supported or indigenous insurgencies.*
- There is a significant need and a great demand in critical Third World countries for an increase in the quantity of security assistance - especially, for internal security, police training, communications equipment, and logistics.*
- Soviet influence in the Third World is greatly abetted by its provision of security and military aid (e.g., Algeria, Syria, Iraq, India).*
- Significant countries that are currently threatened by internal insurgency (often directly or indirectly succored by the USSR) would benefit quickly from relatively small inputs of security assistance (e.g., Sudan, Somalia, Oman, North Yemen).
- Once security assistance funds have been provided to Israel, Egypt, Turkey, and Greece, there is precious little for even relatively small inputs for endangered friends; the aggretrate amount of the program is therefore deceptive as an indicator of its effectiveness.
- The US security assistance program is hampered by the lack of institutional forces and leadership which can, for instance, provide effective training and materiel to friendly police forces.
- The security assistance program lacks an ability to respond quickly to urgent requests for aid; opportunities are therefore sacrificed and/or larger infusions of assistance are required at a later time.
- Security assistance is a highly effective, politically attractive, and relatively inexpensive (compared to US forces) means of shoring of endangered governments - especially, in the Near East, Africa, and Latin America.
- Security assistance, particularly when provided in small but effective doses, permit Third World leaders to avoid the stigma of too-close a relationship with the United States which simultaneously permitting the US to maintain a low profile in regions where sensitivity to superpower presence is acute (e.g., the Persian Gulf).
- The short-term nature of most US security aid commitments and the elaboration of legislative snares has made the US appear an unpredictable and miserly friend to endangered governments like Pakistan and Zaire.

* You sent Haig, Weinberger, Clark + Reed

-- MAP + rundown of Soviet influence

-- memo on US assistance to Syria

-- Memo on US-Soviet competition for influence in the Third World

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The Defense of the Persian Gulf

- The key issue here is the competition for forces between Europe and the Persian Gulf.
 - o State argues that the lower likelihood of war in Europe and the greater relative importance of US forces in Southwest Asia should lead up to giving priority to "Flexible Forces for SWA in the allocation of funds for readiness, sustainability and modernization."
 - o The DoD (and especially the JCS) emphasize the importance of reinforcing Europe if the Soviet's move against Europe simultaneously with a move against SWA. However, the text of Section E, with DoD agreement, now says that in the event of "war with the Soviet Union originating in SWA, forces available for subsequent employment in Europe or the Pacific would be ~~radically~~ reduced."
- There is a basic dilemma in trying to defend Europe against a direct threat while also trying to defend it against a less direct but nonetheless grave threat in SWA. In my view:
 - o State is right in asserting that the probability of war in Europe is much less likely than a Soviet move in SWA.
 - o The paper focuses too exclusively on the contingency of a direct Soviet invasion of SWA, a case which is admittedly very difficult to handle, and doesn't deal enough with the less unlikely contingency of possible Soviet moves which would exploit internal disruptions (in Iran especially) and conflict within the region. Our military forces would be crucially important for dealing with the latter class of contingencies without necessarily involving the ability to move 7 divisions to the region rapidly.
 - o In short, SWA is the ~~worst~~ region of greatest threat. The greater our capacity to deploy forces to SWA the better, even if we can't dispatch a 7 division force right away.

Strategic Forces

- Document needs more emphasis on US exploitation of technological advantage.
 - o ~~Force Soviets to compete in areas where they are weak.~~ *Force Soviets to compete in areas where they are weak.*
 - o Render major Soviet efforts obsolete, impose costly solutions on them.

Force Soviets to compete in areas where they are weak.

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- o Example is US exploitation of accuracy improvements to threaten all Soviet fixed targets, including ICBM silos, forcing them to defend and to go mobile.
- o Support for advantages in stealth, ASW, SSBN.
- Document provides little guidance for resolving looming strategic forces issues.
 - o Criteria for framing MX basing decision.
 - o Should US pursue ABM; long-term US technological advantage, short-term (80s) Soviet deployment advantage, net advantage uncertain but important.
 - o Defense budget cuts, fate of MX and B-1.

In sum, does not make sense to issue such a study until firm direction is given to some of the above tough decisions.

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